Why Speak about Hermeneutics?

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ABSTRACT

Many are the works in Mathematical Education that have analyzes based in the hermeneutics, explicitly or not. However, the elaboration of texts that focus on discussing the philosophical foundations of hermeneutics, understood in different perspectives, is still a demand of this field of knowledge. In order to contribute to this discussion and bring clarification about what is hermeneutic, we wrote this work that approaches it in the perspective of phenomenology, that is, as a philosophy. Starting from different historical conceptions of the term, which has in its roots the synonym of interpreting and translating, we present our understanding of the constitution's course of philosophical hermeneutics, as an ontology of understanding, that is, a way for the human being to comprehend himself and understand the world. In this sense, we envisage contributions of hermeneutics to the research that themes the Education, since, constantly and interpretative-understanding movement of texts, testimonies, expressions of students and pedagogical practice constantly made in the educational context.

Keywords: Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, Mathematics Education.

Por Que Falar sobre Hermenêutica?

RESUMO

Muitos são os trabalhos no âmbito da Educação Matemática que têm fundamentado suas análises na hermenêutica, de modo explícito ou não. Porém, a elaboração de textos que se dediquem a discutir os fundamentos filosóficos da hermenêutica, compreendida em diferentes perspectivas, ainda é uma demanda dessa área de conhecimento. Com o objetivo de contribuir com essa discussão e trazer esclarecimentos sobre o que é hermenêutica, escrevemos este texto que a aborda na perspectiva da fenomenologia, ou seja, enquanto uma filosofia. Partindo de diferentes concepções históricas do termo, que traz em suas raízes o sinônimo de interpretar e traduzir, apresentamos nossa compreensão sobre o percurso da constituição da hermenêutica filosófica, enquanto uma ontologia da compreensão, ou seja, um modo de o ser humano se compreender e compreender o mundo. Nesse sentido, vislumbramos contribuições da hermenêutica às pesquisas que tematizam a

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Educação, visto que, constantemente, faz-se um movimento interpretativo-compreensivo de textos, de depoimentos, de expressões de alunos e da prática pedagógica no contexto educacional.

Palavras-chave: Hermenêutica. Fenomenologia. Educação Matemática.

INTRODUCTION

In the field of Mathematical Education, hermeneutics has been gaining visibility. There is several works about the most various subjects, based on this theory, that structures their methodological analyzes using different hermeneutics, for example, the phenomenology, critical, depth and objective. Do these distinct denominations designate the same root of hermeneutics or are they different philosophies?

In this regard, speaking about hermeneutics requires clarifications, so that the researchers working with it do not assume it without paying attention to the philosophical foundation that supports it. Furthermore, such clarifications are necessary to make clear that there are divergent hermeneutical perspectives to structure research data, since there are many authors and understandings structured in specific currents. In our studies (Mondini, 2013; Batista, 2016; Mondini, Mocrosky & Bicudo, 2017) we used the phenomenological or philosophical hermeneutic and, in this article, we explained the way as we understood it, supported by German authors, as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Hans-George Gadamer.

Our intention is to suspend[1] the philosophical scenario of several debates in which the hermeneutics has made itself present and focus on the one that comes through the phenomenological path, that has sustained our work in the FME[2] study group, as well as other researchers who works in the Mathematical Education field.

THE HERMENEUTIC, FROM THE ART OF INTERPRETING TO THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING

The word hermeneutic, according to Palmer (1989), brings in its origins the concept of interpretation and translation. The etymological meaning of hermeneutic "is connected to the Greek verb *hermeneuein*, usually translated as explain, and the Greek noun *hermeneia*, understood as translate" (Palmer, 1989, p.23, emphasis added). This author also affirms that the terms *hermeneuein* and *hermeneia* are derivations from the Greek God Hermes, a messenger whose function were to translate messages from the Gods to the mortals, that is, to bring to light of human understanding all that the man, as a mortal, would not be able to comprehend.

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[1] Suspension or *epoché* is a term of phenomenology that designates the first steps of a phenomenological attitude, which is the non-immediate judgment or validate the phenomenon investigated with our conceptions and beliefs.

[2] Phenomenology research group in Mathematical Education coordinated by the teachers Maria Aparecida Viggiani Bicudo and Rosa Monteiro Paulo PhD.

Among the attributions of Hermes, son of Zeus to Maia, is the function of transmuting what is beyond human understanding, so that human intelligence can comprehend. He translates the messages from the God's world to the human's world and is attributed to the discovery of language and, afterwards, to writing. (Mondini, 2013, p.22)

In Palmer (1989), we found three meanings attributed to *hermeneuein* and *hermeneia*, deriving from the name of the God Hermes:

[…] to *express* it aloud, in other words, to talk, the *explaining*, as when we explain a situation and *translate* a written work from one language to another, for example. The last concept that the work of a hermeneutic is similar to that of the translator remains naively intrinsic to the meaning attributed to the hermeneutics until the present day. (Palmer, 1989, p.24)

The most modern chronological meaning to the word hermeneutic (biblical exegesis, philological methodology, science of linguist comprehension, methodological basis for the *geisteswissenschaften*,[3] knowledge ontology) are rooted in the terms *hermeneuein* and *hermeneia*.

Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), a German philologist, sustained the thesis that the hermeneutics behind a work should be captured from what the author wished to be captured, meaning; to obtain the intended interpretation would be necessary to capture the oral or written thought from the author. Thus, Wolf defines hermeneutics as "the Science of rules by which the meaning of signs is recognized" (Espósito, 1991, p.87).

Espósito (1991) show us that for Wolf, the interpretation would be related to the dialogue with the author of the work. In order to obtain the true essence of what the author proposed himself to show when he wrote his work it would be necessary for the reader to be prepared not only to interpret it, but also to be able to explain it to others, thus, emphasizing the comprehension-interpretations-application trinomial. For him, the next step would be to practice, since only "the practice leads to the rules interpretation, which should vary according to the object to be interpreted" (Espósito, 1991, p.88).

In this possibility to design the hermeneutic, we observe that the romantic spirit by which the author fits rests in what Gadamer (1999) calls as the "fundamental hermeneutical problem" (Gadamer, 1999, p.459). To Wolf "the interpretation is not a later and opportunely complementary act to comprehending, however, understanding is always to interpret and, therefore, the interpretation is the explicit form of comprehension" (Gadamer, 1999, p.549).

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[3] "All disciplines centered in man's art comprehension, behavior and writing" (Palmer, 1989: p.50).

Georg Anton Friederich Ast (1778-1841) was a classical philologist who sought in philology and philosophy his own way to spread hermeneutic. Ast believed that in order to understand a text, it was necessary to "capture the antique's spirit, the *gesit*" (Espósito, 1991, p.88, emphasis added), that is, it was necessary to search for what is behind the word and language, because they carry the cultural heritage of folks. With this, it makes use of philology as a path to access the internal and external contents of a work.]

To Ast, "the hermeneutic had a task to clarify the work through the internal development of its meaning, as well as to establish the relationship between each part among themselves and broadly with the spirit of its time" (Espósito, 1991, p.88). Thus, with Ast the hermeneutics acquires a significant advance, since in seeking the "spiritual content of the text," Ast abandons the search for grammar and goes on to search for the meaning of different writings, transmitted from ancient times (Espósito, 1991).

The hermeneutics that was only adequate to biblical texts' exegesis to meet the philological principles no longer met the aspirations of the hermeneutics like Schleiermacher. He shared the idea that was necessary to break away from it as a doctrine of ancient texts translations and, like that, open the space to the hermeneutic translation of several texts. Wheter they are sacred or profane texts, there would be a single hermeneutic, in opposition to what Wolf defended, or to Ast's vision, for whom the work of the philologist printed an encyclopedic nature's hermeneutics. Schleiermacher assumed hermeneutic as universal.

> Diverging from Wolf, who considered the needs of a regional hermeneutic, that is, a hermeneutic for each area of knowledge (poetry, history, texts, religious etc.). Schleiermacher considered it possible to construct a general hermeneutic, since, regardless of the possible differences between texts, they kept among themselves a unity, or a general idea, which interact with the grammatical structure to form the meaning. It thus explains his intention: to build a general hermeneutic as the art of comprehension, that could be the base of special hermeneutics. (Espósito, 1991, p.89)

To comprehend the Schleiermacher's conception, we understand that it is necessary to involve the reader in the historical context in which the hermeneutics has been constituted. We see that there is a scenario in which it develops in two distinctive ways, the theological and the philological. In the theological field, there is a interprepation of the Holy Scripture as a path to strong arguemens, hence, the Scriptural's principle of the reformation open ways to a new hermeneutic, that arose by disentangling itself from the highly theological perspective, but without failing to introduce its contribution.

At that time, the Protestant Reformation, in the person of Martin Luther as its main exponent, claims the breaking of the indispensable tradition's character for the exegesis of Holy Scripture, as well as the overthrow of a an interpretative technique in the traditional doctrine style. For Luther, "the Holy Scripture is *sui ipsius interpres*" (Gadamer, 1999:

p.275, emphasis added), that is, the Holy Scripture is its own interpreter and "has a univocal meaning that must be interpreted by it" (Gadamer, 1999, p.275).

Following these paths, the hermeneutic takes new directions, since it had to divorce itself from the dogmatic precepts that theology carries and present itself free to work with several texts. Still, from the historical context that it presents, such as Dilthey argued, the hermeneutic imprints historicity as a necessary practice to the comprehension of being, that is, man is a being dependent of history, necessarily historical (Espósito, 1991, p.93).

Gadamer (1999) presents Dilthey's position on the interpretations liberation regarding the presented dogmas by the Church, assuming that in order to work a text in its essence it is necessary to consider the context in which it is constructed. In this sense, the sacred works lose the Bible's presupposition as a unity and assume the grammatical and historical hermeneutic character.

According to Espósito (1991), to Dilthey

> Historicity means man to understand himself, not through introspection, but through the objectification of life. Man's self-understanding is not direct, but indirect, for in the work, he undergoes a hermeneutic diversion through fixed expressions dating back to the past. The man is a historical dependent being, necessarily historical. (Espósito, 1991, p.92-93)

Thus, for philology as for theology there is no difference between profane and sacred texts. The existence of a single hermeneutic "[…] ends up being not just a propaedeutic function of all historiography – like the art of correct interpretation of written sources – but it also encompasses all he historiography activity" (Gadamer, 1999, p.278). Seen in this way, starting from its historical context, "each phrase cannot be understood except from its own historical context" (Gadamar, 1999, p.278).

Gadamer (1999) points out that the new way to conceive the hermeneutic lies in a hermeneutic circle for interpretation, since with historical conception walking side by side with text comprehension "someone can fully understand each individual element in its meaning, and it, inversely, can only be fully understood from these individual elements" (Gadamer, 1999, p.278).

For Schleiermacher, the interpretation is the movement of circularity or reciprocracity between the general and the particular: the wholeness of the text can be understood from the particularities and these, in their parts, make it possible to comprehend the totality. With this author, hermeneutics is also seen as "the operation to comprehend what is said in a text, exactly as it is said, […] directing the hermeneutic conception as *Theory or art of Comprehension*" (Gadamer, 1999, p.278).

However, Gadamer (1999) makes a remark about the correct meaning that must be given to such terms:

> […] it (the hermeneutic) is not the doctrine of art at service of the philologist or theologist. It is true that Schleiermacher himself ends up giving to his hermeneutic the name doctrine of the art, however, in a completery different systematic meaning. And it seeks to reach in the theorical foundation of the commom procedure to theologists and philologists, to the extent that falls short to both interests, going back to a more original relationship of the thought's comprehension. (Gadamer, 1999, p.280)

Mondini (2013) also emphazis that, with the oppening given to hermeneutic as Theory of Comprehension, "all and any linguistic expression, spoken or written, can be understood". It is possible to see that with these oppening, the hermeneutic dialetical moviment cames to life and launches itself into the world: "interpret to comprehend and comprehend to interpret" (Mondini, 2013, p.23). This dialetical movement is definided by Schleiermacher as the hermeneutic circle (Schleiermacher, 2005, emphasis added).

As Theory of Comprehension, Schleiermacher interweaves the hermeneutic to a more human relationship, where "comprehending means, in principle, to understand one another, and comprehension is, in principle, understanding" (Gadamer, 1999: p 282). Therefore, Schleiermacher differs from Wolf who, with the philological personal stamp, hermeneutic had as function the exegesis of ancient text, and from Ast, who imprinted in hermeneutic the encyclopedic character.

We believe that Schleiermacher's humanistic character points to comprehension be the result of daily observation, where what is strange is only so if someone notices and understand it as such, but if you comprehend it; it is because you performed the interpretative procedure. In this sense, "the comprehension effort has a room each time there is no immediate understanding, and correspondingly every time you have to count on the possibility of a misunderstanding" (Gadamer, 1999, p.281).

Thus, to Schleiermacher,

> Comprehension only turn itself in a special task at the time when this natural life experiences some distortion in the shared vision of the sought, which is a view of the thing in common cause. The moment a misunderstanding occurs, or someone manifests an opinion that causes strangeness because it is incomprehensible, it is only then that natural life becomes so inhibited in relationship with the common cause, that the opinion as an opinion, that is, as an opinion of the others, from you or the text, converts itself in a fixed data. (Gadamer, 1999, p.282-283)

However, even with all of Schleiermacher's contributions to hermeneutic, to Gadamer (1999) there is still a path to follow. The author emphasis the circularity of the inserted comprehension in the "formal relationship between the individual and the whole" (Gadamer, 1999, p.282). This philosopher affirms that the circular movement described by Schleiermacher culminates with the divination leap theory, where the comprehension process pervades the individuality of interpretation. In other words, this theory starts from the principle that the subject will have to assimilate all that the author defined for the work, in a way to produce the fusion between the author-reader. However, when the process is completed, it unravel itself, that is, Schleiermacher understand the hermeneutic circle from a circularity process of beginning, middle and an end, disfigurement the idea of circularity as a process that renew itself with each new learning.

According to Gadamer (1999), to Schleriermacher,

> […] the circular movement of comprehension come and goes through the texts, and when the understanding of them is complete, it is suspended. Consequently, the Schleiermacher's comprehension theory culminates in a theory of divining act, whereby the interpreter merges himself entirely with the author and resolves, from there, all that is strange or unseasoned in the text. (Gadamer, 1999, p.439)

Mondini (2013) also alerts to the comprehension of the hermeneutic circle developed by Schleiermacher. The author emphasizes that Schleiermacher build his theory from a leap in the hermeneutic circle, stating that for this to occur, there is a need for the reader to account for all the text's parts simultaneously, thus establishing a "comparative, intuitive and divinatory" (Mondini, 2013, p.23).

> Comparative because we always compare it with our previous experiences, intuitive because we have something in us that directs us, allowing the opening of what is being said so that we can proceed and "guess" what was said, as a child that hears a new word and understand its meaning. (Mondini, 2013, p.23)

As a way to complement the movement described by Mondini (2013), we sought in Ruedell (2013) the explanation to the divinatory that fulfills the movement used by Schleiermacher as a characterizer of the hermeneutic circle worked. Ruedell (2013) express his vision about one of the elements that characterize the circle, the divination. For him,

> […] it is simply an imagination procedure, which no one can dispense. It is not about a free guess, but it is to find out from the available data. Just as the conception of the work's forms, that is, the structure of the whole, it is just possible by fantasy, the divination, according to Schleiermacher, is the effort to remake the creative

and imaginary project of the author. It is the attempt to retake the author's stylistic singularity. (Ruedell, 2013, p.71)

Therefore, the hermeneutic circle "implies a contradiction in the moment we must capture the whole to comprehend the parts, and it is in the parts that is the meaning of the whole" (Palmer, 1989). Although this movement characterizes the circle, it also characterizes a problem to be solved in this process, since Schleiermacher defines it as simultaneously occurring, but that annul itself after the process conclusion. Gadamer (1999) seeks this problem solution in Heidegger, as we will see next.

THE CONSTITUTION OF A PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTIC FROM HUMAN COMPREHENSION

This section will be aimed to Husserl (1859-1938) and to Heidegger (1889-1976). It will be presented the convergences in it, but also it will be presented what distinguish them, since even as a Husserl's disciple, Heidegger redefines his phenomenology and uses it in the hermeneutic field. Thus, both "seeked by their own methods to hermeneutics in the Phenomenology field, the first worrying about the rigor of Science and the second, with the question about the Being (Mondini, 2013, p.24).

Heidegger had in phenomenology his life's philosophy and, in his own method to research, developed a "method capable to explain the processess of the human existence, in such a way that this, and not the ideology of each one, could became patent" (Espósito, 1991: p.96). However, Heidegger seeked for his own methods as a way to formulate his theories and differentiates himself from his master, precisely by the use of phenomenology as a path to understand and explain the hermeneutic, now no more focused in the science of comprehension and rigor, such as Husserl, but for the seach to comprehending the human being's ways. "Hermeneutic with Heidegger, as interpretation, defines itself in a "comprehension and interpretation ontology", now a ontologically constituted comprehension" (Mondini, Mocrosky & Bicudo, 2017, p.4).

Espósito (1991) also protrays the divergences between Husserl and Heidegger. While for the former "the objective was to turn visible the human consciouness operations, and to reffer all phenomena to it" (Espósito, 1991, p.96), the second sees in his own basis all the hermeneutic studies as a way to use the phenomenology to explain the presence of the being into the world, "a rekingling of the old and forgotten Greek controversy around the being" (Gadamer, 1999, p.388). Heidegger sees in the Greek philosophy renewal a path to bring to present philosophical arguments the interpretation of the Being as existing in the world, presenting his conviction of the human interpretation of being.

However, Espósito (1991) warns us against the temptation to consider the phenomenological method "a doctrine formulated by Husserl and used by Heidegger for other purposes". On the contrary, "Heidegger rethought the very own concept of

phenomenology" (Espósito, 1991, p.97) and imprinted the phenomenology character on hermeneutic.

With Heidegger (2005) and the philosophical hermeneutic there is no more a concern about the rules and their developments, as his master preached,

> […] rather than, with the thought. With Heidegger, hermeneutcs gains philosophical features, allowing another form of rationatility in which the foundation of true is not in the datas and the 'right' way to interpret, thus in the way to think explained by language, allowed by our daily experienced human conditions. (Mondini, 2013, p.24)

Gadamer (1999) reports that such distinction between both was also provoked by Husserl having seen, in his disciple's approach to Dilthey's hermeneutic, "a return to a position previous to Science objectivity" (Gadamer, 1999: p.385). As a result, "under the key term of a 'facticity's hermeneutic', Heidegger opposes to the Husserl's eidetic phenomenology, and the distinction between fact and essence, upon which it relies, a paradoxal demand" (Gadamer, 1999, p.385-386).

However, in *Ser e Tempo*, Heidegger (2005) divertes from Dilthey's philological focus, because he seekes the basics of hermeneutic to a "true comprehension, presenting a Philosophical Hermeneutc that does not care about the rules and their developments, rather with the thinking" (Heidegger, 2005, p.24). According to Espósito (1991), "Heidegger do not deny Dilthey's perspective, but places it in a ontological context, where the world and comprehension are inseparable parts of *Dasein*'s[4] existential ontological constitution" (Espósito, 1991, p.99).

What made Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutic so different from what had been proposed so far in the hermeneutic field is based on the fact that Heidegger sought the essential of each of the two and rejected what he believed to be unimportant. Gadamer (1999) shows this when he defines comprehension from what Heidegger took for himself, which

> [...] *comprehend* is not a resigned ideal of human life experience in spirit's old age, as in Dilthey, but as little as in Husserl, a final methodical ideal of philosophy facing the ingenuity of the just let it be. Conversely, it is the being into the world […]

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[4] It is the central term of Heidegger's philosophy, for it is from it that the author begins his study about the being, attributing to philosophy a new way to comprehend the Being, unlike the traditional ways to comprehend the man. Therefore, Heidegger questions about "what is the being? [or] what is the meaning of being?" (Detoni, 2014, p.96), and by this he evokes the way as the Being is worldly, as an incomplete being, but always seeking the completeness, which only attains in death, since that man is a being-to-the-death. When he quotes the being-there-in-the-world, he refers to the being's spatiality, which is found in the world not only in the physical meaning, but also in the presence and attendance meaning. Thereby, the "presence fuses and shows itself in consonance with the path things are in the world's mundane way, that is, in the world's mundane being" (Mocrosky, 2015, p.4).

comprehension is the way of being the pre-being, as far as someone can – being is 'possibility'. (Gadamer, 1999, p.392, emphasis added)

The phenomenological comprehension described by Heidegger "is not previously fixed, but historically constituted by the person's living experience who is part of the world as other also are, and thus became a human existence's hermeneutic" (Mondini, Mocrosky & Bicudo, 2017, p.4).

Of the above, we anchored in Gadamer (1999), because he gives support to consider that intuition of comprehension as historically constituted by the person's living experience, Heidegger wants to show us that such comprehension attempted from the interpretation of the being, the true and history, which anchors itself in the absolute temporality to give answers about the being. In printing the strand of temporality, Heidegger defines his thesis, as "being itself is time" (Gadamer, 1999, p.389).

From Heidegger's works (2005) and the comprehension's dissemination of the being, in contradiction to the methodological aspect of comprehension, as presented by Mondini, Mocrosky and Bicudo (2017), Heidegger's hermeneutic becomes the Gadamer's object of study. Thus, living with Heidegger influences, Gadamer to seek the hermeneutics' study focused on language's ontology.

Not only based on the language's ontology, Gadamer defines the act of comprehension as "historic, dialectic, linguistic, hermeneutic as the comprehension's ontology, since it is not conceived as act of human's subjective, but as the essential way that *Dasein* has to be in the world" (Espósito, 1991, p.103, emphasis added).

With this principle,

> Gadamer brings comprehension as a tradition and communication as a horizon's fusion. The comprehension is understood as a dialectic movement characterized by agreement, that is, the meeting of our present with our historical experience that opens up to the world as a "comprehension's miracle". Meaning that the understood is observed in a given moment where the focuses is on what is clearly perceived, losing itself in time and space the lived and living comprehension's movement. The feeling that things are not provided packed, but they suddenly happens as if a miracle worked in which comprehension sprang from inside-out of each one individually, and all present in the culturally given worldly history. (Mondini, Mocrosky & Bicudo, 2017, p.5)

Gadamer reposition the meaning of comprehension, stating that it is not as a gathering between the author, work and the reader as Wolf preached, for example; it was necessary for this process to be like a miracle: the comprehension's miracle. "The comprehension's miracle is in the common sense between what is brought by text's tradition and the interpreter, it is a gathering: the horizons' fusion (Mondini, Mocrosky

& Bicudo, 2017, p.5). The authors present us that this "movement is not either subjective neither objective, but intersubjective, so that comprehension is being made" (Mondini, Mocrosky & Bicudo, 2017, p.5).

Therefore, the "hermeneutics' objective is not to advance with rules for an 'objective valid' comprehension, but to conceive its own comprehension in a way as broadly as possible" (Espósito, 1991, p.103). Espósito (1991) also considers that Gadamer's conception about the "interpretation implies the existence of something, since comprehension is the basic structure, historically accumulated and operative, it is underlying, even in Scientific's interpretation" (Espósito, 1991, p.104-105). In other words, "the description of an experience meaning does not come from the interpretation of this interpretation, but from the interpretation's tradition on which is based and of future possibilities that shows up" (Espósito, 1991, p.105).

However, when Gadamer works with hermeneutic as intersubjective interpretation, he has to get rid of the temporal distance's problem, that is, "the time distance and its meaning to comprehension" (Gadamer, 1999, p.443). Gadamer also works with the hermeneutic circle in which the understanding of the parts leads to the understanding of the whole, as well as the comprehension of the whole leads to the understanding of the parts, however, not as Schleiermacher worked, even though both deals with a circular relationship. To Gadamer, "the task is to increase the unity of the comprehended meaning in concentric circles. The correspondent standard for the comprehension's correction always is the concordance of each particularity as a whole" (Gadamer, 1999, p.436).

In the search for the hermeneutic circle's understanding, Gadamer (1999) made a comparison between his definitions described by nineteenth century hermeneutics, who understood it from the "formal relationship between the individual and the whole, as well as its subjective reflection". He goes on comparing, now with Schleiermacher, describing the "divinatory act theory" until it results in the circle's theory described by Heidegger, where "the text's comprehension lies continuously determined by the previous conception's movement of comprehension" (Gadamer, 1999, p.439).

With this knowledge, Gadamer presents his conception about the hermeneutic circle, stating that it is either objective neither subjective, once he describes "the comprehension as the interpretation of the tradition's movement and the interpreter's movement" (Gadamer, 1999, p.439).

The tradition's movement that Gadamer states, directly relates to the historical condition in which the reader is situates, so all interpretation is connected to the distance that separates the author from the interpreter. With this statement, Gadamer (1999) differs from Schleiermacher's hermeneutic; since Schleiermacher considered that, the interpreter should be equated to the original author. Such regards fits in the temporal distance.

To overcome this problem, Gadamer (1999) proposes, "The text meaning overcomes his author not occasionally, but always. That is why comprehension is never a reproductive only behavior, it is always productive" (Gadamer, 1999: p.444). What the author throws with this premise solves the temporal distance's problem, since the author does not need

to go back in time to comprehend what was written. This answer lies in the conclusion that the temporal distance is not a problem anymore, but part of the solution, since it was concluded that the objective knowledge would only be reached from a certain historical distance (Gadamer, 1999, p.445-446).

Such a conclusion was only possible because he presumed that

> […] the time is no more than, primarily, an abyss to transpose because it divides and withdraws, but it is, actually, the foundation that sustains the happening, where the present sticks its roots. The time's distance is not, for consequence, something to overcome. This was rather a historicism's naïve presupposition, that is, what it was necessary to move towards the spirit of that time, to think according to its concepts and representations, instead of thinking according to your own, and only then it could reach historical objectivity. Actually, it is about to recognize the time's distance as a positive and productive comprehension's possibility. It is not a devour abyss, but it is fulfilled with the historical heritage and tradition continuity, whose light is shown to us with what is transmitted. (Gadamer, 1999, p.45)

In 'Verdade e Método', Gadamer strives to show an opposition between the truth and the method. Through the book, the author outlines paths to present a hermeneutic based on dialectic, opposed to the methodological action that he judged as the comprehension's movement from the methods. To the philosopher, "the Truth" could not be reached methodically, but dialectically" (Gadamer, 1999, p.104).

Finally, Gadamer (1999) presents us with the temporality's problem of a work, that is, the temporal distance between what the author printed in the work and the correct interpretation given to it. However, the author understand that there is no correct or wrong interpretation, just the interpretation and that the temporality's problem turned into a solution, since the temporal distance is necessary to happen the miracle of comprehension.

CONSIDERATION ON THE STUDIED

The attentive reader must remember in the beginning of this article where we raised some question that we had the pretension to solve throughout its writing. To answer it, let us remember them: 'can we talk about hermeneutic or hermeneutics?'; 'Could we consider that there were several hermeneutics, or all the authors had the same horizon?' We understand that due to the theme's demanded complexity, there is still a lot to study so we can be able to answer them. However, we cannot deny that each philosopher, philologist and hermeneutic presented through this work contributed to the study of hermeneutic.

We emphasize that we are not advocating the linearity of the construction of the hermeneutics' concept; neither have we stated that it was built from ruptures over time. What we affirm is that in its construction in the historical temporality, it has sprouted

and strengthened the hermeneutics' understanding we have today, in the studied authors' perspective and that the same line can be rethought.

Thereby, the main goal of this work came from the need to seek for a cornerstone in a theory that could repost both to the author as to the reader, the need of a substantiated interpretation in strong precepts, in order to avoid crumbling at any moment.

In these terms, the philosophical hermeneutic has as a goal to offer such cornerstone, as a theory of comprehension, so that produced works in the education field acquire the rigor that a hermeneutics' analysis demands. However, why talk about hermeneutic in education? Because we believe that hermeneutic, as the theory of comprehension, can contribute to research in the education field, since we are constantly performing an interpretative-comprehensive movement of texts, from testimonies and from students' expression when we conduct several researches.

Thus, we understand the hermeneutic stamp employed in researches using it as methodology, allowing the further development of analytical-interpretative disputes and contributes to the investigation of a pedagogical practice in education to acquire a more accurate analysis, allowing the visualization of what lies between the lines of the research.

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTIONS STATEMENTS

J.O.B was responsible for the idealization of the format of the proposed text. L.F.M and F.M. developed the theory. All authors discussed and contributed to the final version of the manuscript.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this paper as no new data was created or analysed in this study.

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